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The Army— A Year After Pearl Harbor



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
Americans are proud of the transformation of the assembly lines of their industrial plants to meet the call for increased productive power in the output of guns, tanks, planes, and munitions. Their pride should be equally great in the creation of an army 30 times its prewar strength of a quarter of a million men, organized, equipped, and trained in modern combat.

And it is the assembly line of the industrial plant that is the pattern for our army training mill. The scheme calls for both individual and unit instructional courses. Special training, theoretical and practical, is given to assembled specialists and officers to fit them for their technical duties and command functions. Leadership is taught progressively from the control of the squad by the corporal to the command of a division by a major general.

Individual instruction is followed by unit training, to include the division as an independent force and in combined maneuver where it is an integral part of an army. Thus, the standardized training centers throughout the country produce the key pins and parts and finally, in the large organizational and maneuver plants, the division units roll off the assembly lines.

But these training areas are not all geared for the production of standardized units. Many of the parts are uniformed, trained, and equipped for unusual types of terrain and weather conditions, and for assignment as task forces. These specialized units include parachute and ski-parachute troops, mountain, jungle, desert, amphibious, and cavalry forces, fast-moving anti-aircraft, tank destroyer, barrage balloon, and all the complex service maintenance and supply organizations vital to the existence of a modern field

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army. So our million and more men beyond the seas find no strangeness in their varied missions in the snows and ice of the Arctic region and the mountain, jungle, and desert lands of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific.

Keeping pace with, if not transcending, the organization and training of our ground forces is the production miracle of the Army Air Forces. From a prewar strength of 5,000 planes and a monthly output of 500, we have leaped into our 50,000 goal and a creative stride of about 5,000 a month. Moreover, this mighty aerial armada enters its second year of war with a manpower objective 44 times its peace strength of 1940.

At the turn of the year, in close combat unity with our ground and naval units, the sound from the motors of our planes can be heard in the skies over the six continents and the seven seas. But this was not true a year ago. As a result of the surprise attack by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and our island outposts in the Pacific, we lost most of our small but growing air force in the Philippines and our transpacific airway, with stepping-stones in Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Guam. Our East and West Coast air-defense setup had to be rebuilt and our outpost positions in the Canal Zone, Alaska, and Hawaii strengthened.

A new air route was developed across the Pacific, and bases were established in Australia and India, with forward fields in China for striking at Japan. Following the laying of this network of ground installations, new air forces were organized in Egypt to play a part in the general offensive against the Axis in the Mediterranean sector.

About this time the USAAF in the European theater was created, and in November the one in French North Africa came into being.

In the meantime, the Air Transport Command was developing four great air routes for sending planes, equipment, supplies, men, and mail to all the fighting fronts. This, in brief, has been the expansion of our air arm in the past year and its extension from the home to the global front.

In recounting the year's achievements of the Army, no change has made for greater efficiency than the reconstruc-

A Year After Pearl Harbor ARMORED FORCES

1941



1942

**5 DIVISIONS****14 DIVISIONS***TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH*

1941

1942

1943 (GOAL)

1,700,000**4,500,000****7,500,000**

tion of the general staff, supply, and administrative system. The complicated and unwieldy setup of some dozen chiefs of arms and services, each with his separate scheme of training and supply, has been discarded. In its place, the chief of staff now commands, administers, and supplies the Army through his own general staff and three lieutenant-general assistants, who control ground troops, air forces, and supply.

The Army's manpower objective is 7,500,000 by 1943—more than 2,000,000 for the air forces and more than 5,000,000 for the ground troops. Whether this estimate is beyond requirement no one without exact knowledge of our present global strategy and postwar rehabilitation plan can prophesy. However, our High Command has the information on which to estimate the enemy's strength. Furthermore, our leaders envisage that our pledged part in the administration and policing of the world to secure the peace ahead of us may demand an army of occupation greater in size than that required to win the war. These simple reasons, therefore, seem good and sufficient for our one-year-old wartime Army to move on unabated toward its manpower goal for 1943.

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